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This paper is divided in two parts. In the first part, we present some data of the Portuguese 
economy aiming to capture some of its main long trends and the way it reacts to the introduction of 
the single currency in Europe. Since Portugal follow a similar path with Spain in what concerns the 
European economic integration process, we developed a comparative analysis between the two 
Iberian countries trying to capture some dynamics that can aid to understand the different ways how 
the two economies reacted to the introduction of the euro and, in this phase of the economic 
integration in Europe, how they suffered the 2007-2008 international crisis and reacted to its effects. 
To evaluate and compare the two countries paths we use some fundamental macroeconomic 
indicators as, output and employment, investment, external accounts, budget balances and 
government debts. The comparison with Europe's average economic performance is also present, 
trying to understand which country follow a more “European path”. 
 In the second part, we concentrate on the euro system crisis trying to give some contributes 
to the ongoing discussion about the role and effectiveness of the euro as an internal adjustment 
variable. Not only in terms of the pre-creation of the better conditions for the European economy 
to respond to cyclical and structural crisis processes, but also in terms of dealing with the 
developments of the real crisis process that explode in Europe in 2007-2008 and gave origin to what 
was called the “sovereign debt crisis” that deeply harmed the most week economies, like Portugal but 
also like Spain. In particular, we discuss the issue of the effectiveness versus the exhaustion of 
monetary policy followed by the ECB in response to the Eurozone effects of the global economic 
and financial crisis. 
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This paper has a double aim. First, we want to discuss some aspects of the long-term 
development of the Portuguese economy in order to better understand the way it reacted to 
the main consequences of the international financial crisis and the subsequent impacts at the 
Eurozone level. Second, we want to discuss the role of the monetary policy that has been 
adopted by the ECB, in order to deal with the asymmetries that have been produced in the 
Eurozone, particularly in the context of the so-called “sovereign debt crisis”.  
 Having in mind these objectives, we divided the paper in two parts.   
 In the first part, we present some data of the Portuguese economy aiming to capture 
some of its main long trends and the way it reacts to the introduction of the single currency in 
Europe. Since Portugal follow a similar path with Spain in what concerns the European economic 
integration process, we developed a comparative analysis between the two Iberian countries 
trying to capture some dynamics that can aid to understand the different ways how the two 
economies reacted to the introduction of the euro and, in this phase of the economic integration 
in Europe, how they suffered and reacted to the 2007-2008 international crisis effects. To 
evaluate and compare the two countries paths we use some fundamental macroeconomic 
indicators as, output and employment, investment, external accounts, budget balances and 
government debts. The comparison with Europe's average economic performance is also 
present, trying to understand which country follow a more “European path”. 
 In the second part, we concentrate on the particular euro system crisis trying to give 
some contributes to the ongoing discussion about the role and effectiveness of the euro as an 
internal adjustment variable. Not only in terms of the pre-creation of the better conditions for 
the European economy to respond to cyclical and structural crisis processes, but also in terms 
of dealing with the developments of the real crisis process that exploded in Europe in 2007-2008 
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and gave origin to what was called the “sovereign debt crisis” that deeply harmed the most week 
economies, like Portugal but also like Spain. In particular, we discuss the issue of the 
effectiveness versus the exhaustion of the so-called unconventional monetary policy followed by 
the ECB in response to the Eurozone effects of the global economic and financial crisis.  
 
 
1. PORTUGAL AND SPAIN: SOME LONG-TERM TENDENCIES 
AND THE EURO 
 
 In the aftermath of the democratization processes initiated, respectively, in 1974 and 
1975, Portugal and Spain followed relatively similar paths with respect on the European 
economic integration options. 
 After the constitution of democratic constitutional governments, both countries started 
adhesion processes to the then called European Economic Communities which led to the 
simultaneous entry on the 1st January 1986. Since that date, they have always been together in 
the fundamental steps towards the economic and monetary union, having shared the same 
vision about the importance of European integration for economic and social development of 
both countries, as well as the same desire to be in the forefront of the integration developments 
that have taken place and culminated in the creation of the euro. 
 Despite this identity of vision and European path, Portugal and Spain did not experience 
the same economic performance nor obtained the same results. Without any pretensions to 
completeness, we present below some elements that seek to translate the course of the two 
countries within an extended period, which roughly covers four distinct periods, marked by key 
events that have changed their economies functioning: i) a period before the crisis of the 
beginning of the 1970s, known as the oil crisis. A crisis which would mark the resurgence of 
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liberal economic conceptions, in view of the exhaustion of Keynesian ideas and practices 
prevailing until then, and would have direct consequences in the very processes of 
democratization that began shortly thereafter; ii) a period that covered the preparation for 
adhesion to the Communities, which would extend from democratization to the end of 1985; iii) 
a period following the adhesion to the Communities until the introduction of the euro; iv) and, 
finally, the Euro period that also includes the effects of the great economic and financial crisis 
triggered by the particular crisis of the American subprime mortgage market. 
  Of course, these are arbitrary milestones, chosen according to the aims of the 
analysis. But they reflect the concern to identify decisive milestones of the structural changings 
of the functioning conditions of the two countries’ economies and, at the same time, extended 
enough to capture these changings.  
 
 
1.1. OUTPUT DYNAMICS 
 
When looking at output dynamics, from a long-term perspective, there is a general trend 
towards deceleration of economic growth which is accentuated in successive moments of crisis. 
 The international economic crisis of 1974-75 interrupts a long period of economic 
growth of the world economy and of the European economy, in particular. A period which began 
after the Second World War and that is generally associated with the hegemony of a Keynesian 
paradigm of economic interventionism. 
 The need to rebuild the European economies created the conditions for a generalized 
acceptance of the idea of a strong state economic intervention, aimed at restoring the civil 
economy, restoring the levels of output and at absorbing the demobilized labour force. But the 
new political conditions in Europe, resulting from the defeat of Germany and strengthening of 
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the Soviet bloc, also favoured the development of the new European projects of integration, the 
concern for growth and economic and social cohesion reducing, at the same time, the field of 
attraction of the more liberal ideas of the markets efficiency on the resources allocation, which, 
in fact, were in sharp decline since the 1930’s crisis. 
 The stability of growth in the almost three decades following the end of World War II, 
with average rates around 5% per year, the reduction of asymmetries within and between 
countries, the non-occurrence of serious crises such as those that occurred in the pre-war 
period, cemented the conviction that a new era of economic and social progress had begun, 
soon baptized by some authors as “post-cyclical capitalism”, wanting to reflect the idea that 
economic policy, inspired by Keynes' theory, had definitively overcome the "invisible hand" of 
neoclassical theorists. 
 In this sense, the crisis of the 1970s, due to its breadth and depth, was a surprise that 
shook strongly all the established convictions, the beginning of a new era, characterized by the 
return of the belief in the markets efficiency and by the excommunication of interventionist 
ideas, that led to a new theoretical and policy reference framework that had an expression in 
the so-called "Washington Consensus", synthetized by John Williamson at the end of the 1980’s, 
and which was still at the basis of the "Structural macroeconomic adjustment programs" 
prescribed to European countries with economic difficulties, such as Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal in the aftermath of the so-called sovereign debt crises.  
 For several reasons that it is not possible to develop within the scope of this 
intervention, the crisis of the 1970s represents an effective turning point in the functioning of 
the world economy and of the different countries’ economies which reflected, among other 
aspects, in the re-emergence of the economic cycle and in the general reduction of growth 
dynamics. The crisis of the 1970s was followed by the crisis of the 1980s, the crisis of the 1990s, 
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the crisis of the beginning of the millennium and the crisis starting at the end of 2008, whose 
effects are still running. 
 Charts 1 and 2, below, show well what we said above, in what regards the economies of 
Spain and Portugal and also in what regards European Union and Euro zone. A declining trend, 
that accentuates after each crisis process, is well visible in each of the economies and in Europe 
as a whole. 
  
Chart 1: Real GDP: 1961 – 2019, % annual changes (2018 and 2019: Forecasts) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
 The trend is, however, more pronounced in the Portuguese economy which evolves 
from growth rates of more than 6% per year in the period prior to 1974, to a near stagnation 
after the entrance in the Eurozone, clearly beginning a diverging process from Europe. 
 As far as Spain is concerned, although we can detect a declining trend, which 
accentuates in the period that goes from the establishment of democracy to the adhesion to the 
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it is not so pronounced as the Portuguese trend. We can even see an inversion of relative 
positions after participation in the euro zone.  
 Contrary to what happened with Portugal, which was clearly confronted with an adverse 
shock that had been boosted by the 2008 crisis, Spain has an average post-euro growth rate, in 
the period between 1999 and 2014, of around 1.7% per year, higher than the European average, 
that is around 1.4% - 1.2% (EU 15 and EA 12) and clearly higher than the Portuguese average 
growth rate which stays by 0.5%. Although we can see a general negative effect of the creation 
of the euro over the economic dynamics, which reflects substantially its ineffectiveness as an 
instrument of macroeconomic adjustment, Spain seems to have weathered better, surpassing 
the European growth average rate, unlike Portugal which reveals evidence of a deep structural 
crisis, positioning itself in the tail of the economic growth in Europe. A situation that is 
particularly highlighted in Chart 2. 
 
Chart 2: Real GDP: Annual average rates, Periods: 1960 - 1974; 1975 – 1985; 1986 – 1998; 1999 – 2014; 2015, 
2017, 2018 and 2019, 2018 and 2019: Forecasts 
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 To end the analysis of the output dynamics we highlight the effects of the adjustment 
program that was applied in Portugal between May 2011 and May 2014. If we look behind to 
find a year with an output level identical to the minimum reached in 2013 we need go back until 
2000, practically the beginning of the euro. If we compare with the Spanish case the fall in output 
is much less significant with a decline to the level of 2005 (see Chart 3, bellow). 
 Of course, these falls provoked also deep structural changes in the economies of both 
countries with consequences that will persist for many years ahead. But it is not the aim of this 
paper to deal with this kind of problems. In any case, we will say that these effects can have 
direct consequences in terms of the conditions for growth sustainability, particularly in Portugal, 
a country with a not so strong economic base.  
 
Chart 3: Real GDP: 1960 – 2019, Annual Index - 1999 = 100, (2018 and 2019: Forecasts) 
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1.2. UNEMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 
 
Concerning the evolution of employment, the situations are also different between 
Portugal and Spain reflecting very different starting structural conditions and economic 
dynamics and, also, different economic policies priorities. And, above all, different adjustment 
dynamics to external shocks induced by the adhesion to the European economic integration 
process and by the economic crisis processes that have been produced in the meantime. 
 It is interesting to note the relatively low unemployment rates in the period ending in 
1974 (less than 3%). Portugal verifies in this period a minimum rate of 1.7% in 1974 reflecting 
not only the post-war economic dynamism and the economic policy priorities of the time, 
centred on the goal of full employment, but also the emigration phenomenon to Europe and the 
military mobilization to the colonial war. And is interesting to note also the explosion of 
unemployment in the aftermath of the crisis of the 1970s, accentuated by the political upheavals 
that took place in both countries after 1974 and 1975 and which, in the case of Spain, reaches 
historical proportions over a period spanning more than 20 years, with unemployment rates 
systematically above 15%, reaching a peak in 1994 with unemployment rate at 22% of active 
population and declining from that point on, until reaching a minimum in the year immediately 
prior to the 2007 crisis with 8.2% of the labour force. 
 Portugal experiences a different situation from Spain with unemployment contained at 
substantial low levels, despite the military demobilization following the end of the colonial war, 
the reduction of the emigration flows and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of returned 
people from the former colonies of Africa. The peak of unemployment is reached in 1985, the 
year before the adhesion to the European Communities, with an employment rate of 9,8% of 
active population, while reflecting the adjustment program agreed with the IMF for the period 
1983 – 1985 (see Chart 4 bellow). 
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 The participation in the Communities and the subsequent inflow of funding, together 
with a high international conjuncture, due to the dollar declining and the fall of the oil prices, 
and a succession of good agricultural years, created the conditions for a good economic 
performance of Portugal that impacted positively on the return to relatively high levels of 
growth. In the period that goes from 1986 to the creation of the euro the Portuguese economy 
compares rather well with their partners by registering an annual growth rate of more than 4% 
versus 2,6% and 2,7% for UE 15 and EA 12, respectively, overtaking Spain Which stands at 3,1%. 
This period was a golden age of the Portuguese economy, nourishing all the easing illusions that 
would later be paid with high interests. Unemployment reduces substantially reaching a 
minimum level of 5% in the years of 1991 and 1992. 
 On the other hand, Spain, despite some inflection, continues to face high rates of 
unemployment, reaching as already mentioned, an historical peak in 1994, with 22% of 
unemployed people. 
 Unlike Portugal, Spain has experienced a stronger structural adjustment process, of 
economic renewal and modernization, while Portugal has witnessed the beginning of a 
resources transferring process to the non-tradable goods sector, fuelled by the injection of 
European funds and easy access to credit, which artificially secured unemployment, but 
inhibited the in-depth restructuring of the productive sector. 
 Since the second half of the 1990s, the process of structural adjustment in Spain seems 
to have ended, with a decline in unemployment, a trend that continues after the creation of the 
euro, despite the cyclical increase resulting from the beginning of the millennium crisis, to reach 
a record low of 8,2% in the year immediately prior to the crisis in 2007. From here, an 
exponential increase occurs, with unemployment rate reaching in 2013 the impressive peak of 
26,1% of the active population. 
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 As far as Portugal is concerned, the evolution is completely different. In throughout the 
period from adhesion to the creation of the euro, Portugal has rates of unemployment 
substantially below the European average, including during the years of recession in the first 
half of the 1990s. This situation is completely changed from the third year of the creation of the 
euro in 2002, when an ascending trajectory of unemployment begins reaching a historic peak in 
2013 with a 16,4% rate of unemployment. A Chart that would substantially be higher did not 
have the emigration to Europe and to the ex-colonies working as exhaust valve returning to 
levels close to the 1960s. 
 Also, with regard to unemployment, is true what we said about the difference in 
economic dynamism between the two countries after the creation of the euro. 
The Spanish better economic performance, which seems to have positively reacted to 
the creation of the new European currency, contrary to what seems to have happened with 
Portugal, is reflected in a better behaviour of unemployment which reduces substantially until 
the outbreak of the 2007’s international crisis.  
 As might be expected, with the crisis unemployment explodes in both countries. But, 
while in Spain there is a reversal of trend in Portugal we see a marked increase of the trend that 
came from behind. In any case it is important to note that Portugal does not reach the levels of 
unemployment verified in Spain, showing a different role of this economic variable as 
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Chart 4: Unemployment rates: 1960 – 2019 (2018 and 2019: Forecasts) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
 
1.3. INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Charts 5, 6, 7 and 8 seek to capture the evolution of investment, through the behaviour 
of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, the total economy and government in particular. In this case 
too, there are substantial differences between the economic dynamics of the two countries. 
 The first finding that results from the observation of the behaviour of this economic 
variable in the two countries is the greater volatility in the Portuguese economy (Chart 5 bellow). 
Spain follows a more regular pattern, closer to the European average, whereas in Portugal there 
is a more erratic behaviour, with large fluctuations, showing certainly, a lower consistency of 
the Portuguese economy and a greater vulnerability to the evolution of demand or dependence 
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 Nonetheless, there is some similarity in terms of general trends in both countries and 
the European average. But once again, the creation of the euro has changed everything. 
 In both countries, in the period up to 1974, there is a trend towards higher rates of 
investment, compared to the European average, reflecting a catching up process. In the 
following period (1975 – 1985) we can see a decline, more pronounced in Spain, once again to 
recover from 1985 onwards and during the post-adhesion period, with the exception of the crisis 
of the early 1990s where, as one would expect, there is a further decline. 
 Once again, after the introduction of the euro, the paths of the two countries have 
diverged significantly. Spain maintains relatively high rates of investment progress, above the 
European average, only interrupted by the 2008 crisis, while Portugal faces a period of loss of 
investment dynamism, with systematically negative growth rates, reflecting a structural 
disinvestment trend that sporadic recoveries in some years are not enough to counteract. 
 
Chart 5: Gross fixed capital formation at 2010 prices: 1961 – 2019, Annual changes (%) (2018 and 2019: Forecasts) 
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 Chart 6 bellow, is particularly illuminating in the investment performance of both 
countries, showing the Spain's relative good investment performance that continues after the 
euro until the arriving of the 2007 crisis stopped everything. In the case of Portugal, we can see 
clearly the declining trend of investment that develops from 2001 and which is accentuated by 
the crisis. If we look at the year 2013, we see that Portugal declined to investment levels similar 
to those of 1989, while Spain has fallen much less to 1999-2000 levels, in line with previous 
trends.  
 
Chart 6: Gross fixed capital formation (Volume): 1960 – 2019, Annual Index - 1999 = 100 (2018 and 2019: 
Forecasts) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
 Chart 7, which shows the weight of GFCF on GDP, also illustrates the dynamics of 
investment in both countries. All of what was said above said has a concentrated expression 
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when they reach a ratio GFCF on GDP of around 25%, slightly higher than the European average, 
to follow up the general decline during the following 10 years, between 1975 and 1985. 
 With the adhesion to the Communities, begins a new upward trend which, in the case 
of Spain, accentuates in the post-euro period, until reaching a maximum of 29.6% of GDP in 
2007. Portugal already sees the peak of GFCF in 2000, with a GDP weight of approximately 26%, 
declining from there to a low of 15% in 2013, that compares with around 20% in Spain and 19.3% 
and 19.6% in the EU 15 and EA 12, respectively. 
 
Chart 7: Gross fixed capital formation /GDP (%): total economy (2010 prices), 1960 – 2019 (2018 and 2019: 
Forecasts) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
1.3.1. PUBLIC INVESTMENT  
 
Another interesting indicator concerns the behaviour of public investment (Graph 7). 
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from levels of 3.6% of GDP to levels above 5% in 2009, including levels around 4.5 – 4.6% in 2007 
and 2008, Portugal sees public investment declining since practically the same moment, from 
levels of 5.5% to 3.2% of GDP in 2007, rising again in 2008, 2009 and 2010, when it reached a 
new peak of 5.2% of GDP. In both countries, there is a visible use of public investment as a tool 
to respond to the crisis, reflecting the guidelines and immediate concerns of national and 
European government officials. But the inflection in these guidelines at the levels of European 
policymakers, which redirects the focus of attention to deficits and public debts, provokes a 
drastic reversal of public investment in the two countries to levels around 2% of GDP, becoming 
a procyclical variable. Portugal still prolongs the effort in 2010 but public investment falls 
dramatically in the following years, until reaching a minimum in 2014 with 2% of GDP. Spain 
begins the inversion a year earlier in 2009, falling to the same levels in 2014. But while in 
Portugal there is a recover of public investment in the years of 2009 and 2010, by the 
government's action at the time, in a attempt to answer the most negative effects of the crisis, 
in Spain the same option is verified, but in the context of a reinforcement of the trend that was 
running before. Comparing with the European average it is very clear the huge recession effect 
produced in both countries, especially if we look to the pre-crisis levels of public investment. 
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Chart 8: Gross fixed capital formation/GDP (%): general government (current prices), 1960 – 2019 (2018 and 2019: 
Forecasts) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
1.4. BUDGET BALANCES 
 
In what concerns public finances, the performances of the two countries are very 
different, in result of the distinctive economic dynamics discussed above (See Chart 9 bellow). 
 Spain has shown a remarkable capacity for rebalancing public accounts, which has 
manifested since the beginning of the second half of the 1990s, being able to adjust deficits 
exceeding 7% of GDP into surpluses, starting in 2004 and reaching a value of 2% in the years 
immediately prior to the crisis, 2006 and 2007. 
 As far as Portugal is concerned, there is an adjustment in the period leading up to the 
euro, reflecting the concern for compliance with the Maastricht criteria. This is followed by 
swings that evolve towards a further deterioration in 2004 and 2005 to more than 6% of GDP, 
pushed by the crisis situation at the beginning of the new millennium. The new government 
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has succeeded in correcting it, reaching the targets one year earlier than agreed in 2008 (values 
in real time). 
 In both cases, the crisis has led to an understandable deterioration in budget balances 
to levels around 10 - 11% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, plunging the two countries into deep fiscal 
crises, giving strength to the sovereign debt crises thesis in peripheral countries. 
 As is well known, Portugal applies an economic and financial adjustment program 
agreed with the so-called Troika, between May 2011 and May 2014, with a financing of EUR 78 
billion, accepting cyclical and structural adjustment commitments with more direct and visible 
implications in terms of rebalancing public and external accounts. Spain, despite the financing 
difficulties is able to keep out of these processes, receiving only aid to support the financial 
sector, accepting in accordance commitments of economic and financial adjustment, but 
keeping outside the direct tutelage of international institutions. Maybe for this reason, but 
surely also for reasons of good previous economic and public accounts performance, Spain does 
not undergo a process of correcting the public deficit as drastically as Portugal, maintaining a 
deficit of 10.3% in 2012, against 5.6% in Portugal, starting only from there, truly, the process of 
adjustment but more in tune with its own general economic recovery. In 2014, Spain verifies a 
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Chart 9: Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-): general government (Percentage of GDP at current prices (excessive 
deficit procedure) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
 These same trends are evident in the numbers of the primary deficit (Chart 10, bellow), 
with Portugal, unlike Spain, registering primary surpluses in 2013 and 2014, reflecting the more 
drastic fiscal adjustment in relation to that was verified in the neighbour country. 
 
Chart 10: Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interest: general government. (Percentage of GDP at 
current prices (excessive deficit procedure) 
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 In what concerns structural deficits, Portugal and Spain, as we can see on Chart 11 
bellow, don’t match the commitments and it is possible to see some difficulties after 2014, when 
the economies began to recover.  Of course, we are in presence of a controversial concept that 
needs more discussion, but in so far as it is a requirement of the Stability Pact it is possible to 
anticipate here a source of additional problems that can be used with political objectives. 
 
Chart 11: Structural balance of general government: - Adjustment based on potential GDP Excessive deficit 
procedure (Percentage of potencial GDP at currente prices) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
1.5. PUBLIC DEBTS  
 
The better overall performance of public accounts in Spain, as a result of the better 
overall economic performance in the period of the euro existence, is also present in the public 
debt behaviour, which shows a sustained reduction path from the peak of 65.6%, reached in 
1996, to a 35.5% ratio, in the year immediately prior to the 2007 crisis. In contrast, Portugal 
having maintained the average debt around the 50% ratio of GDP, i.e., inside the Maastricht 
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reaches a minimum of 50.3% of GDP, it suffers a strong inversion of this reduction trajectory and 
the beginning of an upward trend that leads the debt to 68.4% of GDP in 2007, almost the double 
of that one registered in Spain (See Chart 12, bellow). 
 As has been the case in Europe in general, the crisis has triggered debt in both countries, 
reaching levels of 97.7% and 130.2% in Spain and Portugal, respectively, face a European average 
of 92% and 95% %, in the EU15 and EA12. What is important to emphasize in this case is once 
again the difference between the two countries structural dynamics, with Spain debt 
deteriorating as a direct consequence of the crisis, while Portugal verifies an accentuation of a 
trend that came from the past, seeing all the fragilities accumulated during the euro phase 
become more evident. 
 
Chart 12: General government consolidated gross debt (Percentage of GDP at current prices (excessive deficit 
procedure) 
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1.6. EXTERNAL BALANCES 
 
In the case of both countries, external adjustment seems to have been the most 
successful objective since Spain and Portugal managed to move from high current account 
deficits, which reached peaks of 9.3% of GDP in 2007, in the first case, and 11.4% in 2008, in the 
second case, to surplus from 2013 onwards (Chart 13, bellow). To a large extent, the success of 
this adjustment lies in the decrease of economic activity that has taken place in both countries 
in the aftermath of the crisis and the austerity measures that have been adopted which caused 
a sharp fall in imports. But other factors have also played a role, both on the export side and on 
the import side, in particular the fall of the oil prices. 
 In any case, the adjustment in these countries is similar to the one that took place more 
generally in the euro area and which has resulted in a reduction of the imbalance that had been 
accumulated over the years, and particularly since the creation of the euro, between the current 
account of Germany and the current accounts of the generality of the euro zone countries.  
 In spite of the visible differences between current accounts developments in Spain and 
Portugal, with the latter country showing a chronic tendency for the production of large external 
deficits, there is some kind of a convergence between the two countries dynamics to increase 
external negative balances, particularly since the creation of the euro zone, with peaks during 
the international financial crisis. In both cases, this deterioration of the external accounts, when 
compared with the development of Germany's surpluses, reflects the failure of the euro system 
to work as an internal adjustment mechanism of the area. 
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Chart 13:Balance on current transactions with the rest of the world (National accounts) (Percentage of gross 
domestic product at current prices) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
 
1.6.1. NET LENDING – NET BORROWING 
 
Notwithstanding the need of a deeper analysis of the reasons that led to this apparent 
success of the ability to balance external accounts and the degree of their sustainability in the 
case of a stronger economic recovery, it is an evident fact that relieved external pressures by 
generating net lending capacity in both countries, starting in 2012 and following the European 
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Chart 14:Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-): total economy (Percentage of gross domestic product at current 
prices) 
 
Source: AMECO, Nov. 2017 
 
   
1.7. ADDITIONAL REMARKS 
 
From the brief comparison that has been made of the evolution and performances of 
the two Iberian economies, it is possible to draw some conclusions that, of course, need further 
study. 
 The first and perhaps the most significant conclusion is that both Spain and Portugal are 
following the general trend in Europe for the loss of economic dynamism that has been running 
since the crisis of the early 1970s but that has become more pronounced after the creation of 
the euro. In any case, the loss of dynamism seems lower in Spain than in Portugal. Spain seems 
to have reacted much better to the euro shock, with average growth rates above the European 
average during this period, while the Portuguese economy practically stagnates, entering a 
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 The second conclusion has to do with the differentiated role that unemployment seems 
to play in the two economies as an adjustment variable. Unemployment seems to be much more 
sensitive to economic cycles in Spain, possibly in result of different priorities of economic policy 
and the different functioning of the labour market vis-à-vis Portugal. Here too one can see the 
great difference between Spain and Portugal in reaction to the euro creation. Spain shows a 
better capacity to adapt to the new conditions, with a reduction of unemployment, only 
interrupted as a consequence of the crisis, while Portugal shows a loss of general economic 
dynamism that provoked the rise of unemployment in counter-cycle of the rest of Europe, a 
trend that the crisis only strengthened. 
 The third conclusion recognizes the better overall investment performance, in the case 
of Spain, including public investment, which is most evident in the period as European 
Communities membership, including in the euro phase. In Portugal, on the contrary, after some 
initial post-addition euphoria there is a significant loss of dynamism in this component of the 
output, which accentuates in the euro phase, including at public investment level. A symptom 
of this difference in performances is the fact that in 2014, in the aftermath of the effects of the 
international crisis, Spain has returned to the investment levels, measured by the GFCF, 
registered in 1999-2000, while Portugal returned to levels similar to those verified in 1989. 
 The fourth conclusion concerns public accounts showing a much better overall 
performance of Spain, including obtaining budget surpluses from 1997 and throughout the euro 
phase until the crisis. Portugal, on the contrary, shows a chronic difficulty in ensuring 
fundamental balances at public accounts level, with very few exceptions, the last of which, 
precisely before the crisis, in 2007 and 2008. Portugal succeeded in bringing the excessive deficit 
procedure, opened in 2005, to an end, one year earlier than it had agreed with the European 
Commission. There is also a less "austere" attitude in Spain regarding fiscal policy, which is 
certainly due to the slack allowed by the excellent pre-crisis performance, but also to the fact 
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that it has managed to keep the country out of any direct intervention from the Troika, with the 
exception of the banking sector. In which concerns public debt, Spain verifies the general trend 
of post-crisis Europe, also in this case revealing a more relaxed situation than Portugal whose 
problems precede the crisis and are in line with its overall economic performance.  
 The fifth conclusion concerns external accounts. Once again it is evident the better 
overall performance of Spain but, curiously, both countries converge to a similar balance 
deterioration during the period of the euro. In Portugal and Spain, we see an increase of the 
current accounts imbalances. The adjustment verified in both countries, in the aftermath of the 
2009 crisis, follows the general trend towards a rebalancing in Europe, with a reduction of 
Germany's surpluses in parallel with the reduction of the deficits of its euro partners. But above 
all this adjustment reflects the strong decline in domestic economic activity, and it is still to early 
for demonstrating its sustainability, particularly in the event of a significant resumption of the 
economic activity.  
 The sixth remark is more a comment than a conclusion. The estimates and projections 
for 2017 and for 2018 and 2019 point towards a certain strengthening of the ongoing economic 
recovery. But uncertainties are still present at the horizon and the risk of inversion of the present 
dynamics is high. That’s the main reason why the central banks keep the fundamental references 
of the monetary policy followed in recent years, of low interest rates. Even in this recovery 
phase, Spain seems to perform better than Portugal, notwithstanding Portugal have been able 
to recover some convergence with Euro zone average. In any case it seems that structural 
problems that we talked above persist and need to be attacked, primarily at the Eurozone level. 
 Finally, we can conclude from the significant difference in economic performances of 
the two countries over the last three or four decades, both shaped by significant changes in the 
international economic system and by shocks of diverse nature that profoundly affected the 
domestic and international dynamics of the different economies. In this period, Spain has shown 
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a remarkable ability to adapt and take advantage of new situations, with particular emphasis in 
what concerns the functioning of the new European currency phase. On the contrary, Portugal 
has shown greater difficulties in adapting to the new demands of international competition, and 
these difficulties have been accentuated following the introduction of the single European 
currency, of which it was also a founding member like Spain. Certainly, the reasons behind the 
economic history of the two countries largely explain these differences, but one cannot exclude, 
on one hand, different domestic economic options, which have resulted in different uses of the 
opportunities offered by the accession to the European project and, on the other hand, different 
situations of vulnerability in the face of the progressive inefficiency of the institutions and 
internal adjustment mechanisms of the European Union, which were aggravated by the creation 
of the euro. Spain saw its economy strengthened. On the contrary, Portugal saw its 
vulnerabilities become more pronounced. 
 
 
2. EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS EXHAUSTION OF THE 
MONETARY POLICY OF THE ECB: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
THE SO-CALLED “UNCONVENTIONAL MEASURES” 
 
 According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the main objective of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), which includes the ECB, is to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to this primary objective, the ESCB supports the economic policies of the Union, 
considering the fulfilling of the objectives of this Union as defined in Article 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union. Of note among these objectives is point 3 of the Article which sets out growth 
and economic principles, based on price stability. The goal of full employment is also mentioned 
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but at a secondary level and subordinated to the fulfilment of the main objective. The role of 
the ESCB in this context is to define and implement the monetary policy of the Union, through 
short-term interest rates management, thus influencing the development of economic 
conditions in order to ensure mid-term price stability in the euro area. Price stability is defined 
in terms of the annual increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HIPC), at a rate 
close but below 2% over the medium term. As monetary policy instruments, the ECB uses open 
market operations, designed to manage liquidity in the banking system and signal the stance of 
monetary policy, standing facilities, designed to provide or absorb liquidity in the overnight 
market, and reserve requirements, designed to maintain stabilization of interest rates in the 
money market and to create or enlarge a structural liquidity shortage. This is what is considered 
the conventional monetary policy tools. 
 Following the effects deepening of the international economic and financial crisis the 
ECB decided to improve the tool box of the monetary policy using more and more the so-called 
unconventional measures, to the exact extent of the loss of effectiveness of the so-called 
conventional measures. 
 We aim to discuss now, the issue of the effectiveness versus the exhaustion of the 
monetary policy of the ECB, trying to understand the relationship between the development of 
the crisis, the use of increasing unconventional measures and the limits of the monetary policy 
as a main tool to deal with the Eurozone asymmetric effects of the international crisis. 
 The discussion will develop in four steps in addition to this introduction. First, we will 
consider the increasing use of unconventional monetary policy by the ECB as an answer to de 
deepening of the crisis and the inability of the European authorities and national governments 
to deal with its main consequences. Second, we discuss the so-called “liquidity trap” hypothesis 
in the context where the unconventional monetary policy brought the interest rates to the zero 
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lower bound at which they still find themselves to this day. Finally, we recall the endogeneity 
versus exogeneity hypotheses of money supply.  
  
2.1. THE FOUR PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY 
POLICY 
 
 Following the third quarter of 2008, after the outbreak of the international economic 
and financial crisis, the ECB decided to introduce a set of additional monetary policy measures, 
completely unprecedented regarding their nature, scope and magnitude, which were 
designated as "unconventional measures". As early as August 2007, when the signs of the global 
crisis were already visible, the ECB decided to intervene, like its major partners, through the use 
of strong liquidity injections in an attempt to limit the effects on the functioning of the banking 
and financing system. Since then, the ECB has continued using these and other unconventional 
measures, given that it was its normal or conventional practice until then, widening the range 
of instruments that it started to use against the context in which the international economic and 
financial crisis developed and the way it manifested in the Eurozone. A new era of ECB 
intervention was opened, with all its titles unprecedented and which, through evolving in stages, 
has extended to the present. 
 
A. First phase:  direct liquidity injection in the market (September 2008 - June 
2014) 
 
 With the introduction of this new type of measures, the ECB widened the range of 
intervention possibilities in managing the crisis, expanding the toolbox available to deal with the 
operational needs of the monetary and financial system. However, simultaneously, it pushed 
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the limits of its own field of intervention, statutorily established in the treaties of the Union, in 
particular concerning the financing of states and public institutions, and approaching the 
traditional intervention of central banks as lenders of last resort. 
 This evolution of the ECB regarding the conduct of monetary policy in the context of the 
European crisis has led to a number of serious divergences between European leaders, which 
have deepened since then, with the Bundesbank and the German government being their main 
opponents. A situation that has led the main heads of the ECB to refine the theoretical argument 
and the practical justification in which to frame the progressive adoption of less and less 
"conventional" measures, especially that of the Vice-President, Vítor Constâncio, who has had 
the most active role in this respect (see, in particular, Constâncio, 2011, 2013, 2015a, 2015b and 
2016). 
 The main argument for unconventional monetary policy is the idea that the conventional 
monetary policy transmission mechanism ceased to function properly, as a result of the 
dysfunctions produced in the financial markets, and proved itself unable to contain the 
deflationary pressures that followed the crisis and, consequently, failed to properly secure the 
objective of price stability - an inflation rate below but close to 2%. 
 The monetary policy transmission mechanism is the process through which monetary 
policy decisions are transmitted to the economy and, ultimately, to the prices level, the main 
target of the ECB's intervention (see ECB website, monetary policy). The scheme of this process 
can be schematically summarized by the diagram below. 
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 This process can be disturbed by several factors that are not controllable by monetary 
policy, namely variation in risk premiums, changes in bank capital that affect their credit 
conditions, changes in the economic environment and in the global economy, changes in fiscal 
policy or changes in commodity prices. These are called shocks outside the control of the central 
bank.  
 At the same time, even in normal conditions, the transmission mechanism is 
characterized by operating dynamics that are somewhat lengthy, variable and uncertain, 
particularly in contexts where shocks outside central bank control become dominant. This has 
been the case with the economic and financial crisis triggered on 2008, making monetary policy 
uncertain in its effects or, in extreme cases, completely ineffective. 
 In this extreme situation, there has been a malfunction of the mechanism transmitting 
central bank decisions to the economy that has distorted or even prevented the arrival of the 
effects, at least in the desired way, to the ultimate goal of the ECB, which is the level of prices. 
This malfunction justified the adoption of exceptional measures, designated "unconventional", 
creating a sort of "bypass" between monetary policy and the level of prices, avoiding the 
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 According to the official justification of the ECB, the basis of the adoption of 
unconventional monetary policy was the malfunctioning of some segments of the financial 
markets that have prevented normal financing of the economy, thus disturbing the operating of 
the transmission mechanism (Fig. 3). Direct supply of liquidity to the market by the ECB seeks to 
prevent the collapse of important financial institutions, with the central bank assuming the role 
of lender of last resort in a liquidity crisis context. 
 A second justification for the introduction of unconventional monetary policy refers to 
the nature and scope of the measures. In addition, this domain introduces the so-called 
"separation principle" (Constâncio, 2011). 
 According to this principle, there is a clear separation between the purposes of 
conventional and unconventional measures. Unconventional measures are complementary to 
the former in having clearly defined and temporally limited objectives. They are intended to 
ensure that disruptions in financial markets do not prevent the conventional policy from doing 
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the malfunctioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is evident and withdrawn 
as soon as this feature is recovered. 
 In this sense, and also according to the heads of the ECB, non-standard measures are 
distinct from the "quantitative easing" that is used by the Fed or the BoE, because they are not 
intended as a substitute for conventional interest rate policy in the context of "zero lower 
bound" or as a way to manage the "trade-off" between inflation volatility in the short run and 
price stability in the long run. Rather, unconventional measures are designed to ensure that the 
conventional measures are effective in all timeframes. 
 They work thus as a support mechanism to the conventional policy in a period of 
exception when disruptions in the normal financing channels of the financial system and of the 
economy manifest. They are no longer necessary when the situation normalizes and 
conventional monetary policy regains its effectiveness, and must therefore be removed. This is 
what automatically occurs in those situations, where financing operations have a defined time 
horizon and are not an object of explicit renewal. This was the case with the first measures 
adopted after the 2008 crisis that materialized in a huge direct liquidity injection in the market  
 
B. Second phase: approaching the role of “lender of last resort” (June 2014 – 
March 2016) 
 
 Despite the statement regarding the exceptional and temporary character of 
unconventional measures, the reality is that they came to stay and eventually become as 
"normal" as conventional measures, being adopted regularly in a form expected by economic 
agents and with increasing diversity. As a result of the persistent disturbance of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, of accentuation of deflationary trends and of the evolution of 
the actual economic and financial crisis, successive new "unconventional" measures were used, 
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namely, liquidity provided at fixed rates, full liquidity allotment, extension of maturities for loans 
granted by the ECB, including those granted for very long terms, widened eligibility conditions 
for collateral, direct purchases of government bonds and mortgage bonds, decreased 
requirements for minimum reserves, in a continuous process growing in scale, the creativity of 
which tending to accelerate. 
 In June and September 2014 more unconventional measures were introduced, 
considered of a new class: two programs of assets purchased from the private sector – an Asset 
Backed Securities Purchase Program (ABSPP) and a third Covered Bond Purchase Program  
(CBPP3), adopted in order to allow selective intervention in the markets with decisive influence 
on the financing of the non-financial sector; and a new series of Targeted Long-term Refinancing 
Operations (TLTROs), up to 4 years,  to improve bank lending to the non-financial private sector 
in the euro area. According to officials of the ECB, the measures marked a new phase in the 
development of unconventional monetary policy. A stage where the ECB clearly stated the 
willingness to actively expand the size of its balance sheet up to the levels needed to ease the 
monetary policy stance, in a situation where interest rates reached their lowest level. 
 These new measures represented a qualitative leap over previous measures in that they 
no longer intended only to overcome the dysfunctions of the transmission mechanism. They 
wanted to directly influence the economy through specific channels overtaking this transmission 
mechanism in its role. We reached a stage where the ECB no longer relies on the ability of the 
banking system to use well the liquidity facilities that are provided, by injecting itself more 
money into the economy through lending operations, creating direct channels of monetary 
transmission, as shown in Fig. 4, below. 
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 At the same time, the ECB aimed to create better conditions for the banking system 
itself to be able to make a correction of their balance sheets without this translating into a 
narrowing of credit for the economy. 
 It meant, in fact, a new attitude of the ECB involving a closer approach more of a 
"quantitative easing" stance, followed by the Fed and other central banks, in line with the role 
of "lender of last resort". A formally rejected stance, or at least not assumed up to here. 
At the same time, these new measures also meant the ECB's commitment to the 
maintenance of low interest rates, in an extended time horizon, even beyond the achievement 
of economic recovery. A situation of inflation rate "overshooting" is even accepted, in the 
context of economic growth that is intended to encourage the use of these and other measures 
of an unconventional character. 
 
C. Third phase: the liquidity trap (March 2016 - ….) 
 
 A third phase of unconventional monetary policy was opened following the decisions of 
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The "zero lower bound" is fully reached with the setting of the interest rate on the main 
refinancing operations at 0%. However, the most significant fact is the acceptance of the 
possibility of financing the economy at rates as low as the rate applicable to the permanent 
facility deposit existing at the operation start date – that is, at negative rates. This possibility is 
foreseen under the new target long-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II) in the case of banks 
exceeding a reference value of net credit provided to the economy. 
With this decision, a new stage of intervention is opened. A real Pandora's Box from 
which no one truly knows what can result, despite all the declarations that monetary policy will 
continue to be able to use the interest rate instrument. The next step, with it still being necessary 
to reduce interest rates, can only be the setting of the main refinancing rate in negative territory. 
Which can only be considered as a denial of monetary policy theory, not to mention its actual 
practice. 
 The important question in this situation is this: will the unconventional monetary policy 
work? Despite all the positive reassurances on this issue, the reality is that the use of increasingly 
radical unconventional measures may only show otherwise. That is, unconventional monetary 
is entering a progressive exhaustion process in its ability to influence the economy in the desired 
direction, as a drug addict who requires increasingly stronger doses to address the symptoms of 
a disease, as the body will be used to the substance and the disease does not stop spreading. 
 This is an image that can be applied to the so-called liquidity trap, a situation where, 
according to many opinions, the global economy, and European economy in particular, find 
themselves in. 
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2.2. THE LIQUIDITY TRAP: SOME CONSIDERATIONS USING THE IS/LM MODEL 
 
 The analysis of the liquidity trap can be used as a reference for understanding the 
ongoing economic situation in Europe and also, with the necessary adaptations, the current 
situation of the global economy (see, among others, Krugman, 2012 and Temin & Vines, 2014). 
 We are faced with significantly lower investment levels compared to pre-crisis levels. 
Furthermore, at the same time, interest rates have reached negative levels, if we refer to the 
banking system's relations with the ECB, with obvious effects over the non-financial sector. 
The traditional IS/LM model, despite the simplifying assumptions that underpin it, can 
be a useful analytical framework for understanding what is happening to monetary policy, both 
in its conventional and unconventional components. 
 As it is known, the IS curve (Investment/Saving) is constructed from three relationships: 
the investment demand function; changes on aggregate demand as a result of changes on 
investment decisions when the interest rate varies; and the relationship between different 
levels of interest rate and output and the equality between savings and investment. On the other 
hand, the derivation of the curve satisfies the following propositions: an increase in the interest 
rate causes a reduction in investment demand, which in turn is reflected in an output reduction. 
 The IS curve represents, therefore, the combinations of interest rate and output levels 
that ensure the equilibrium condition in the market of goods and services. That is, total demand 
D, given the income level Y and the cost of credit i, equals the total supply Y, (D (Y, i) = Y), always 
bearing in mind the equality between investment and saving. Its slope is, therefore, negative, in 
the space of the interest rate and output dynamics. 
 In turn, the LM curve (Liquidity Preference, Money Supply) is derived from the following 
relationships: the relationship between output and money demand; the relationship between 
money demand and interest rate; and the relation between the money market equilibrium 
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(money demand and money supply balance) and the different levels of the real interest rate. 
The derivation of the LM curve conforms to the following propositions: an increase in output 
generates an increase in money demand which, in turn, generates an increase in the interest 
rate. 
 The LM curve represents, then, the different combinations of interest rate and level of 
output that ensure equilibrium in the money market.  That is, the balance between money 
demand and money supply, Md (Y, i) = M/P, given the nominal supply of money M and the price 
level P. The slope of the LM curve is therefore positive in the space of the interest rate and 
output dynamics. 
 In "normal" conditions, simultaneous equilibrium in the market of goods and services 
and the money market produces a positive interest rate (i1) and a certain level of real output 
(Y1). The equilibrium point is located graphically in the 1st quadrant, with movements to the left 
and to the right being conceivable for both curves, ensuring the conditions for monetary and 
fiscal policies effectiveness and different combinations of simultaneous equilibrium in both 
markets, represented by the different intersections of IS/LM curves within the shaded circle of 
Figure 4, below: 
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 Consider, however, the case where the intersection of the IS/LM curves does not match 
in the 1st quadrant, but in the 4th quadrant. That is, a situation where theoretically the 
intersection occurs in an area of negative levels of interest rates for different output levels. 
 This can occur in a context where the IS curve has a strong shift to the left as a result of 
contractionary fiscal policies as happened in Europe following the so-called sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe, where concerns with containment of deficits and public debt led to a widespread 
decline in public spending. 
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Fig. 5: “Abnormal” simultaneous equilibrium 
 
 
 In such a situation, represented in Fig. 5 above, equilibrium output is given by Y0 and the 
interest rate is equal to 0. An increase in the money supply moves the LM curve to the right, 
(LM1  LM2) but has no effect on the interest rate that, at least theoretically, cannot go down 
more. This means that investment can no longer be stimulated in this way. Monetary policy 
becomes ineffective. 
 By contrast, fiscal policy, through public spending or by tax reduction, can shift the IS 
curve to the right stimulating, in this way, the output level. Fiscal policy acquires an additional 
effectiveness to the extent that, given the loss of effectiveness of monetary policy, it becomes 
the only way to increase output. 
 It can also be seen, regarding the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy, that the 
LM curve can be modified only through the action of two factors: changes in the money supply 
and changes in autonomous money demand. The IS curve, in turn, is influenced by five factors: 
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autonomous consumption spending, investment spending, government consumption, net 
exports and the level of taxes. This means that in a situation of monetary policy blocking, the IS 
curve can be shifted to the right, through the influence that fiscal policy directly or indirectly has 
on the economy through the operation of these channels. 
 The analysis using the IS/LM model can also explain the relationship between the two 
macroeconomic policies. Fiscal policy works through the economic relationship represented in 
the IS curve. In turn, monetary policy works through the relationship translated by the LM curve. 
However, as can be seen in Fig. 4, the LM curve only affects the economy when it intersects the 
IS curve with a positive interest rate. In a situation where the intersection between the two 
curves, theoretically, only operates in a negative interest rate zone, monetary policy become 
completely ineffective and the economy falls in the liquid trap. 
Moreover, we come to the crux of the matter. Can monetary policy back to play a role 
in this situation? 
 No longer working through its normal channels, monetary policy may act indirectly 
facilitating the operation of fiscal policy to move the IS curve to the right (IS1  IS2) (Fig. 6). This 
can be done through the accommodation of any public deficits, that result from the use of 
expansionary fiscal policy, through direct funding from the central bank. 
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Fig. 6:The role of fiscal policy 
 
 
2.3. EXOGENEITY VERSUS ENDOGENEITY OF MONEY SUPPLY 
 
 Another important issue for understanding the current situation relates to the 
discussion of the process of monetary creation by the economic system. 
In the framework of the IS/LM model, the construction of the LM curve is associated 
with the hypothesis of exogenous money supply. That is, it is assumed that money supply is 
controlled by the central bank, being independent from the demand that results from the 
activity of economic agent. 
 Underlying this idea is the theory of the money multiplier, which introduces the 
separation between the Monetary Base - composed of currency in circulation and the required 
reserves held by the Central Bank - and the money supply itself, which is the money, created by 
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the banks in their relations with economic agents. The money multiplier mechanism works 
between these, which is supposed to convey the changes in the monetary base, the central 
bank's responsibility, to the money supply, as represented in the movements in the LM curve. 
 This exogeneity of money supply, as described here, has always been controversial in 
economic theory. Moreover, the current situation involving the intervention of the ECB, in 
particular with its evident inability to influence the economy, with the desired strength, through 
its conventional and unconventional liquidity injections, has raised more doubts about this 
exogeneity hypothesis, giving strength to the opposite hypothesis of money supply endogeneity. 
That is, unlike the exogenous money supply hypothesis, banks first provide liquidity to the 
economy through the credit they grant and only then do they turn to the central bank for 
refinancing to establish the reserves needed to cover the deposits that they manage through 
lending. Therefore, the route is not from the central bank to the economy, but from the 
economy to the central bank.  
 According to the endogeneity hypothesis, the central bank can only accommodate the 
money created by commercial banks in their relations with economic agents, and had no ability 
to determine any quantitative goals for money supply. This is, incidentally, one of the arguments 
most frequently used by the heads of the ECB to justify the adoption of unconventional 
measures, as a means to undo the tensions in the banking system funding. Instead of causing an 
uncontrolled expansion of the money supply (M3) generating inflation, the expansion of the ECB 
balance sheet has served above all to prevent its further decline (Graph. 1 and Fig. 7). According 
to the proponents of unconventional monetary policy, in the absence of unconventional 
measures the growth of money supply would have fallen much more. Probably, it would have 
reached the levels seen in the crisis of the 1930s, with all the known consequences for levels of 
economic activity and unemployment. 
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 The endogeneity hypothesis of money supply is very important and allows us to 
understand several difficulties that monetary policy is facing today. 
 Recalling the relation of the monetary base with lending by commercial banks, we can 
describe the following sequence: 
 






Demand for credit Banking loans Deposits (Money Supply)
Money base Banking System financing Reserves
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 Obviously, the demand for credit depends on the state of the economy and the level of 
confidence in the future by economic agents. 
The fact that money supply can be considered endogenously determined means that 
the LM curve is horizontal for a given interest rate, the financing being elastic at this interest 
rate.  The IS curve to the right (IS1  IS2) ceases to have any influence in determining the 
interest rate. This situation is shown in Fig. 8, below. 
 
 
Chart 17:  Endogeneity of Money supply 
 
 
As is easily understandable, when the economy reaches a situation of this nature, it means 
that monetary policy ceases to have any role in determining the level of economic activity. If the 
central bank expands the reserves in a voluntary manner, trying to get economic results by 
expanding the money supply, it can only generate excess reserves by commercial banks pushing 
interest rates down. No increase in money supply is effectively produced. By contrast, fiscal 
policy obtains full importance. Somehow, this is what has happened in the Eurozone and other 
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economic zones with the central banks expanding the reserves of the banking system beyond 
all limits through "quantitative easing", without having been able, at least until now, to expand 
the demand for funds by the non-financial sector as necessary to significantly influence the level 
of aggregate demand, as would be their intention. 
 
 
3. FINAL REMARKS 
 
There is little left over to use regarding the "tool box" available by the ECB. And as 
regards what is left, only with a large degree of "elasticity" of interpretation will it fit within what 
the ECB is supposed to be able to do under the European Treaty and its own statutes. 
 An additional problem has to do with coordination of monetary policy with fiscal policy 
in the euro area. The former, increasingly oriented in an expansionary direction and the latter 
continuingly tied to a contractionary view, particularly with regard to the countries most 
affected by the crisis effects, more indebted and, therefore, more dramatically dependent on a 
stimulus demand to be able to get out of economic anaemia in which they find themselves. 
 There is, therefore, somewhat of a manifestation of an economic schizophrenia, which 
can be verified at the level of institutions with more responsibility in the conduct of international 
economic policies, particularly with regard to the ECB and the IMF.  
 In all its last most important interventions, Mario Draghi has urged governments to use 
fiscal policies that promote growth. We recall, in particular, the press conference, to present the 
decisions of ECB Governing Council Meeting of 10 March 2016, that marked the beginning of 
the third phase of the so-called unconventional monetary policy, where he stated that "Fiscal 
policies should support economic recovery …", at the same time as affirming that “... while 
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remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the European Union", to add at the end "at the 
same time, all countries should strive for a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies", 
( Draghi, 2016a). 
 Discounting the aforementioned schizophrenia, evident in the contradictory statements 
between the call to use fiscal policy and the appeal for "compliance" with the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the ECB president's concern with the continued refusal of the use of 
fiscal policy in the euro area is clear, particularly by countries with economic surplus, with 
Germany at the head. But also, jointly by the EU and the euro area member states, as an 
instrument to streamline economic activity via aggregate demand stimulus. A situation that, if 
it continues, could accelerate even further the exhaustion process of monetary policy, both in 
its conventional and unconventional versions. 
 It is this awareness that justifies the growing concern of the ECB to build a theoretical 
and empirical justification for the need to promote public investment. There is a clear 
reorientation of economic studies in this direction, which also meet the need to provide 
institutional support to the Juncker Plan, "A new start for Europe", presented to the European 
Parliament on 15 July 2014, following his election as the new President of the European 
Commission. 
 In this regard, the study published in the ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 2/2016, "Public 
Investment in Europe" (ECB, 2016) should be mentioned, which recognizes the sharp drop in 
public investment in Europe, since the crisis, and states that "An Increase in public investment 
has positive demand effects and can contribute to the economy's potential output by increasing 
the stock of public capital" (ECB, 2016: p. 13). Considering the monetary policy followed by the 
ECB, the study recognizes that "... an increase in public investment will have the strongest short-
term demand effects, including in terms of spill overs to other countries, with an anticipated 
accommodative monetary policy", and that " this finding strengthens the case for increasing 
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public investment in the current low-inflation environment". Still following the study, it 
concludes that “... a debt or revenue financed increase in productive public investment implies 
significantly larger short-term output gains compared with an increase in  investment 
financed by cutting other public expenditure”. Conclusions which, however, do not seem to have 
been suitably taken into account regarding the general direction of economic policies pursued 
by the EU and the euro area, leading to the inconsistency and schizophrenia already mentioned. 
 Also at the level of the IMF, there is a recognition of the importance of relaunching public 
investment on a comprehensive and coordinated scale, although this had not been exempt from 
criticism of incoherence and schizophrenia as manifested with particular sharpness in assistance 
programs in which the IMF participated as a member of the Troikas. Even before the ECB, the 
IMF, through the statements of its leading figure, Christine Lagarde, and also through the 
statements of its most senior economists, such as Oliver Blanchard, drew attention to the effects 
of the austerity policies implemented across the board and without taking into account the 
specific situations of regions and countries, recognizing the negative impact on growth and 
employment and, more than that, for the persistence at the world economy level, of a general 
trend towards economic stagnation. In this regard, it is important to mention the World 
Economic Outlook, April 2016 (IMF, 2016), significantly entitled "Too slow for too long", where 
growth-oriented policies receive clear support from the analysis made of the general economic 
conditions and the factors that led to them. And, finally, the work published on the IMF Journal, 
Finance & Development, by Ostry et al. (20016), where the authors clear conclude, after a cross-
countries analysis of the policies adopted in response to the crisis, that instead of delivering 
growth, some neo-liberal policies have increased inequality, in turn jeopardizing durable 
expansion. 
 This re-orientation of IMF concerns began to become evident in the WEO of October 
2014 where, in the 3rd chapter it significantly raises the issue, "Is it time for an infrastructure 
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push? The macroeconomic effects of public investment.", to give the answer “This chapter finds 
that increased public infrastructure investment raises output in both the short and long term, 
particularly during periods of economic slack and when investment effectiveness is high. This 
suggests that in countries with infrastructure needs, the time is right for an infrastructure push: 
borrowing costs are low and demand is weak in advanced economies, and there are 
infrastructure bottlenecks in many emerg¬ing market and developing economies. Debt-financed 
projects could have large output effects without increas¬ing the debt-to-GDP ratio, if clearly 
identified infra¬structure needs are met through efficient investment.” 
 The OECD seems going in a similar direction when emphasising, in its Interim Economic 
Outlook, of February 16, 2016, following the recognition of the weak economic growth, that “A 
strong collective policy response is urgent. Global macroeconomic policy, comprising monetary, 
fiscal and structural actions, must become more supportive of demand and resource allocation. 
Experience to date suggests that reliance on monetary policy alone has been insufficient to 
deliver satisfactory growth, so that greater use of fiscal and structural levers is required”. 
 Seen retrospectively, the monetary policy response of the ECB to the development of 
the crisis seems to have been more a reaction to events than an effective response to the 
economic problems. Although all the improvements, compared to the times of the former 
President Jean-Claude Trichet, the reality is that the current leaders failed to act in advance, 
intervening mainly in extreme situations to prevent disaster. 
 However, if this intervention has proved crucial, it has also contributed to the 
accumulation of tensions that cyclically threaten to explode pushing the economy to limit 
situations. It is precisely these tensions accumulation dynamics that has driven ECB intervention 
toward increasingly unconventional measures. 
 However, these unconventional measures have not found, until now, the necessary 
support in terms of fiscal and budgetary policies, which continue to manifest a resistance to 
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meet the real needs of the economy. Instead, as these policies continue to focus on issues of 
fiscal balance and public debt, they have acted in the opposite way, demanding more and more 
from monetary policy that, by its very nature, is limited in its ability to deal with all the problems 
that affect the economy. 
 It is, precisely, this contradiction between the stances of fiscal and monetary policies 
that has boosted the effect of exhaustion of monetary policy, discussed in this essay. 
When called upon to use less and less conventional instruments, monetary policy that 
is supposed to be followed by the ECB reveals its weak institutional architecture and its 
inconsistent theoretical framework. While not being completely negative, in that it has enabled 
pragmatism in response to the crisis, the use of increasingly unconventional measures pushed 
monetary policy towards a boundary zone where it has begun to deny itself, when it accepted 
within its toolbox the use of negative interest rates. 
 To conclude, we will say that what is at stake in how Europe and the Eurozone in 
particular have reacted to the crisis, is the euro system itself. 
 Designed to provide a joint response of the monetary zone to the problems of 
international adjustment it has not internally found a suitable complement to the correction of 
asymmetries between countries that, as opposed to the starting assumptions, have ended up 
accentuating these, denying the verification of the optimistic endogeneity hypothesis for the 
monetary area. 
 Within this perspective, ideas that point to a solution of a "more Europe" kind to address 
the problems do not seem realistic. This view runs the risk of accentuating the removal of 
decisions from the concrete realities of countries, strengthening theoretical approaches to the 
detriment of reality analyses and the power of distant bureaucracies to the detriment of agents 
subject to the direct scrutiny of citizens. This, ultimately, can lead to the denial of the very 
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concept of economic and monetary integration applied to the reality of Europe and the 
Eurozone. 
 A general review of the euro system is therefore, justified in order to adjust it to the 
current dynamics of the different European economies and to their joint participation in the 
global economy. Furthermore, the immediate recovery of all rights of citizenship for fiscal policy 
is also justified in order to curb the monetary policy exhaustion process and enable it to bring 
back the economy to a sustained area reversing the stagnation tendencies that affect it. 
 A final word to the recovery of the European economy that seems finally to be running 
more firmly since the middle of 2016. There will be little doubt about the positive role that the 
ECB intervention has played in creating the conditions to give greater sustainability to the 
reversal of the long period of stagnation. But we discussed also the limits of the monetary policy, 
even in its broader unconventional use as an instrument to deal with all the needs of a 
sustainable recovery. In any case, there is no certainty that macroeconomic policy, beyond 
monetary policy, has finally found the appropriate way to deal with the weaknesses evidenced 
by the euro system throughout the crisis process. 
 In this sense, we cannot fail to have a mixed feeling in relation to the words of Draghi in 
the Forum of Central Banking that took place last June 2017 in Portugal: “For many years after 
the financial crisis, economic performance was lacklustre across advanced economies. Now, the 
global recovery is firming and broadening. A key issue facing policymakers is ensuring that this 
nascent growth becomes sustainable. 
 Dynamic investment that drives stronger productivity growth is crucial for that – and in 
turn for the eventual normalisation of monetary policy. 
 Investment and productivity growth together can unleash a virtuous circle, so that 
strong growth becomes durable and self-sustaining and, ultimately, is no longer dependent on 
a sizeable monetary policy stimulus”, (Draghi, 2017). 
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 We hope that the positive signs of the economy will not become the justification for 
postponing once again the reform of the euro system which the events of the last decade have 
placed on the high priorities agenda.  
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